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 1
The Zone of Parental Control, The ‘Gilded Cage’ And The Deprivation of a 
Child’s Liberty: Getting Around Article 5. 
Introduction 
The Mental Health Act 1983 Code of Practice describes the law that covers 
admissions to hospital and treatment for mental disorders in children as ‘complex’ 
(Department of Health (DH), 2015). This article will establish that, following P v 
Cheshire West and Chester Council [2014] (referred to as Cheshire West), the law’s 
consideration of the right to liberty under Article 5 of the European Convention on 
Human Rights (ECHR) for children under the age of sixteen is not only complex but 
confusing. The protection of children being deprived of liberty is most timely in light 
of the current review of Deprivation of Liberty Safeguards (DoLS) by the Law 
Commission and the likelihood of a replacement framework. The differing legal 
protection for deprivation of liberty in children under the age of sixteen with a mental 
health disorder or a learning disability was highlighted in the very recent case of Re 
Daniel X [2016], contrasted with Birmingham City Council v D [2016] and the earlier 
decision in the same case Trust A v X [2015]. Importantly, Keehan J held in 
Birmingham City Council v D that a parent could consent to what would amount to a 
deprivation of liberty, however this would not be the case for the same child when 
they attain the age of sixteen because of the protection afforded under the Mental 
Capacity Act (MCA) 2005. 
 
The main argument presented in this paper is that, as a result of parental consent 
being recognised as holding legal authority, these children have their right to liberty 
under Article 5 breached. The lack of court support for this position will be explained 
in the context of the confusing concept of the ‘zone of parental control’ in relation to 
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 2
deprivation of liberty. It will be argued that Keehan J’s notion of a ‘common sense 
approach’ to the zone of parental control in Trust A v X is not satisfactory where the 
issue is deprivation of liberty. Furthermore, that the logical solution is to support 
Mackenzie and Watts’ (2014) call for procedural safeguarding through an extension 
of DoLS or any subsequent safeguarding system to apply equally to children. 
Detention authorised under the Mental Health Act 1983 (MHA) or if applicable under 
section 25 of the Children Act 1989 (CA), in which there are legislated procedural 
requirements and reviews, will not be considered in this discussion.  
 
Deprivation of Liberty: The Gap between Children, Young People and Adults 
The law under Gillick v West Norfolk and Wisbech Area Health Authority [1986] 
provides that a competent child under the age of sixteen can consent to treatment, 
although where treatment is refused the courts almost always overrule any such 
decision (Cave, 2013). The child under the age of sixteen who lacks capacity to make 
decisions regarding their health has their welfare protected under the CA, whereby 
parents have a responsibility to act in their child’s best interests. 
 
In the case of children with a mental disorder, the emphasis is on those children and 
young people receiving treatment that is decided to be in their best interests and to 
avoid deprivation of liberty through use of the MHA (Cave, 2013). Cases concerning 
deprivation of liberty are most common outside of the MHA, where that child lacks 
capacity to consent to inpatient treatment through either a mental health disorder or a 
learning disability (Bowers and Dubicka, 2009). Outside of the MHA, deprivation of 
liberty for children under sixteen is either lawfully sanctioned by the courts under 
their inherent jurisdiction or considered not to be a deprivation of liberty, as it falls 
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 3
under parental responsibility (Bowers and Dubicka, 2009). In sharp contrast, those 
over the age of sixteen in the same position are protected under the MCA in 
accordance with the Family Law Reform Act 1969 and furthermore, on attaining the 
age of eighteen, are protected under the DoLS.  
 
The DoLS were introduced following HL v UK [2005], known as Bournewood, where 
the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) held that the hospital admission of a 
patient with learning disabilities and autism was a deprivation of liberty as he was not 
permitted to leave, consequently engaging Article 5 of the ECHR. Article 5 requires 
that such deprivation must be subject to judicial review and, as this was not provided 
for in the MCA, a gap was identified in the compatibility of domestic law and the 
ECHR, known as the ‘Bournewood gap’. DoLS provides procedural safeguards to 
protect vulnerable adults who are not being detained under the MHA but are deprived 
of their liberty (Mackenzie and Watts, 2010). Importantly, these do not apply to those 
under the age of eighteen, where common law and the CA are relied upon for those 
under the age of sixteen and the MCA for those aged sixteen and seventeen. 
Therefore, within the scope of children’s decision-making, deprivation of liberty 
outside of the MHA is differentiated from that of adults by the lack of legislative 
safeguarding procedures. The issue identified is how a lack of universal safeguarding 
can be compatible with Article 5, if the right to liberty is universal?  
 
The Influence of the European Court of Human Rights 
The right to liberty is provided under Article 5 of the ECHR. Domestic courts and th  
ECtHR in Strasbourg have both had to interpret the ECHR and apply it to the rights of 
children as holders of those rights rather than objects of protection (European Union 
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 4
Agency for Fundamental Rights, 2015). This was most significantly demonstrated in 
the cases of Elsholz v Germany [2000] and Yousef v Netherlands [2003], where the 
ECtHR held that a child’s human rights should always be paramount.  
 
Deprivation of liberty can be considered lawful under Article 5 for those of unsound 
mind, providing that such deprivation is carried out within a legal framework. 
Baroness Hale reiterated in Cheshire West the ‘universal character’ of the ECHR. 
Specifically, Baroness Hale considered the universal application of Article 5 
regardless of disability: 
 ‘In my view, it is axiomatic that people with disabilities, both mental and 
physical, have the same human rights as the rest of the human race. It may 
be that those rights have sometimes to be limited or restricted because of 
their disabilities, but the starting point should be the same as that for 
everyone else.’ (Para 45) 
However, the ECtHR has faced difficulties when interpreting Article 5 in the context 
of whether a deprivation or merely a restriction of liberty has been imposed upon an 
individual. In Guzzardi v Italy [1980] the ECtHR considered the distinction between 
deprivation and restriction of liberty, holding that it was an objective test relating to 
only the intensity or degree as opposed to subjective and therefore the nature or 
substance that determines a deprivation of liberty. Later, in Storck v Germany [2005], 
a subjective element was added, in that a deprivation could only occur if the person 
had not validly consented to the deprivation.  
Prior to Storck, the objective test was applied to children in Nielson v Denmark 
[1988], where a twelve year old was detained in a psychiatric facility on the consent 
of his mother. The court held that there was not a deprivation of liberty since a 
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 5
responsible parent was exercising her custodial rights. However, the court did 
recognise that the State is obligated to ensure that parental consent did not have 
unlimited scope and, importantly, could not deprive a child of liberty. Harbour (2008) 
explains that Nielson was heavily criticised on the basis that the child’s views were 
not considered, particularly in the depth they would be today. Furthermore, as the 
duration of the admission was several months, there was concern that such a duration 
of treatment did amount to a deprivation of liberty (Harbour, 2008).This point was 
most accurately articulated by Judge Salcedo, dissenting in Nielson, who held that  
‘the fact that a parent may legally, and without being subject to any 
judicial review, place a child in his custody in a psychiatric ward, 
constitutes a violation of Article 5 (1)’. (Para 24) 
It seems likely that, had the dissenting opinion been applied to the ruling in Nielson 
and a deprivation of liberty found, the requirement for judicial review in accordance 
with Article 5 (4) would have resulted in DoLS being applied to all persons deprived 
of liberty regardless of age. 
 
The Impact of the ‘Gilded Cage’ for Children 
Before addressing the UK interpretation of Article 5 and Nielson in relation to a 
child’s deprivation of liberty, it is paramount to analyse the scope of the application of 
any breach to a child’s rights under Article 5 following Cheshire West. The UK 
Supreme Court established that a deprivation of liberty must subjectively lack the 
consent of the person. In considering the decision in Guzzardi, Baroness Hale held 
that the essence of a deprivation of liberty must be that it amounts to a restriction of 
physical liberty. In considering the scope and universal application of the definition of 
deprivation of liberty, Baroness Hale explained that 
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 ‘If it would be a deprivation of my liberty to be obliged to live in a 
particular place, subject to constant monitoring and control, only allowed 
out with close supervision, and unable to move away without permission 
even if such an opportunity became available, then it must also be a 
deprivation of the liberty of a disabled person. The fact that my living 
arrangements are comfortable, and indeed make my life as enjoyable as it 
could possibly be, should make no difference. A gilded cage is still a 
cage.’  
 
Baroness Hale’s broadened definition went beyond earlier interpretations of Article 5 
in Bournewood, but effectively meant that the number of people deprived of their 
liberty was increased as a result of the widened definition (Penny and Exworthy, 
2015). In response, Stavert (2015) questioned whether the DoLS now satisfy the 
procedural requirement under Article 5. In particular, Stavert (2015) identified 
children and young people as being particularly vulnerable because of both the lack of 
safeguarding and the broad scope of health and social care settings that could 
potentially deprive liberty following Cheshire West. The Department of Health (2015) 
guidance following Cheshire West did not address the issues for those under the age 
of eighteen. It could be considered that the responsibilities expected of parents to the 
welfare of their children justify there being no additional safeguarding requirements. 
Wheeler and Crabb (2016) argued that parents are in a better position to make 
decisions because of the complex and differing needs of settings caring for children 
with a learning disability or mental health disorder with associated challenging 
behaviour. However, as highlighted by Penny and Exworthy (2015), this fails to 
consider the potentially unlawful position in which Cheshire West has now placed 
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 7
local authorities, charities, hospital trusts, clinicians and other practitioners, where 
deprivation of liberty is of concern.  
 
The Scope of Article 5 for Children within English Law 
The common law position of parental consent authorising treatment for mental health 
disorders, which could also amount to a deprivation of liberty, for children under the 
age of sixteen lacking capacity to consent, was established in a series of cases at the 
end of the twentieth century. In the cases of Re R [1991] and Re K, W and H [1993] 
the courts held that parental consent was valid for compulsory psychiatric treatment 
and did not require further court approval. While these cases related to refusal of 
treatment, they involved admission to secure, inpatient, psychiatric hospitals, the 
children were not free to leave and the treatment was not carried out under the MHA. 
Hawkins et al. (2011) argued that, if these cases were considered today in light of the 
Human Rights Act 1998, deprivation of liberty would be a central issue. 
 
Despite the MCA not being applicable to children under 16, section 25 of the CA 
does allow for the courts to authorise local authorities to restrict the liberty of 
children. This is only where secure accommodation is necessary to prevent the child 
from absconding or to protect the child from self-harm or harming others, outside of a 
clinical setting. In authorising such a restriction, the courts must specify duration and 
that the child must be legally represented in any hearings.  
In Re K [2001] the England and Wales Court of Appeal considered whether restricting 
liberty under section 25 of the CA was compatible with Article 5. Butler-Sloss P held 
that it was compatible because of the judicial review involved in such decisions and 
that it was within the jurisdiction of the courts to protect the child or others from 
Page 7 of 38 Tizard Learning Disability Review
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
Tizard Learning Disability Review
 
 8
harm. She further held that if such restrictions were authorised by a parent alone it 
would not be compatible with Article 5. In RK v BCC, YB and AK [2011] the Court of 
Appeal was asked this question again in relation to deprivation of liberty and Mostyn 
J’s decision in the lower court, that section 25 would never result in deprivation of 
liberty in respect of Article 5. Although agreeing that on the facts of the case, only a 
restriction of liberty had amounted, the court was not in agreement that a deprivation 
of liberty could never occur under section 25. Thorpe LJ held that a parent cannot 
lawfully detain or deprive a child of their liberty without this engaging Article 5. 
However, both Lord Neuberger and Lord Kerr in Cheshire West disagreed with this, 
noting that deprivation of liberty does occur during childhood within the family home 
and is well within the responsibilities of parents expected by society. This is where 
the decision by Keehan J in Birmingham City Council v D was so crucial, as to 
whether parents consenting to what could otherwise be considered a deprivation of 
liberty outside of section 25 in long-term inpatient care fell within the zone of 
parental control. 
 
As already highlighted the decision was that parents did have the authority to provide 
such consent. Before continuing the argument that the decision was incorrect, it is 
worth noting the valid argument against common law establishing such a legal 
position. The scope of the common law could certainly be viewed as too broad and 
that the authority should be legislative in the case of mental health law to provide 
greater clarity and align with existing mental health legislation. Indeed, it is 
imperative that the Law Commission, in its current review of DoLS, explores the 
issue of deprivation of liberty in children in collaboration with parents, clinicians and 
practitioners. The recent case of Re Daniel X [2016] has rather added to the confusing 
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 9
position of the courts outside of section 25 of the CA. Daniel was severely autistic 
and had a learning disability. He was placed into a care home because of difficulties 
in his home circumstances, which deprived him of his liberty as he was not free to 
come and go as he pleased. Although these were care proceedings and the issue was 
not parental consent, it is important to note that Roberts HHJ agreed that a section 25 
order would not be appropriate since this would require Daniel to move to more 
secure accommodation. Therefore, the court ordered that Daniel stay where he was 
but (crucially in recognition of Article 5) that the order be reviewed in twelve months 
and that this time limit was for the courts to set to ensure that Daniel’s rights were 
protected. Should the same level of procedural safeguarding not be required in the 
context of parental consent alone? The unsatisfactory answer, as argued by Keehan J, 
is that parental authority falls within the ‘zone of parental control’. 
 
The Zone of Parental Control 
The concept of the zone of parental control was established in the MHA Code of 
Practice 2008 update. The concept was introduced to provide greater clarity for 
clinicians involved in decision-making with children and young people within mental 
health care, as the expectation to consider both legislation and evolving common law 
was far too great (Hawkins et al., 2011). The zone of parental control allows parents 
to consent for treatment and inpatient admission through recognition of Nielson, 
although no definition was provided because the cases were dependent on the 
individual facts (Hawkins et al., 2011). The concept of the zone of parental control 
was widely criticised. Watts and Mackenzie (2013) argued that its interpretation by 
clinicians was likely to be too subjective. In the case of psychiatric treatment of long 
duration, where a deprivation of liberty can occur without parental consent, Gillam 
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 10
(2010) raises concern over the ethical boundaries between this and short-term 
treatment admission. Gillam (2010) further describes the original concept as being so 
wide that a definition of the scope of parental control was needed. 
 
Following Cheshire West, the MHA Code of Practice was updated in 2015 and 
attempted to expand on the concept. Specifically, the update included a section on the 
deprivation of liberty of children, recognising the complexities of such cases. The 
Code of Practice requires that clinicians have regard to the degree of parental control 
and supervision that would be expected for a child of that age with the characteristics 
of the child in question. However, this approach fails to acknowledge that, if a child 
lacks capacity to consent, and this is not going to change in adulthood, why should 
parents not continue to provide such control after the age of sixteen? What is 
highlighted is the arbitrary consideration of age under domestic law, where the issue 
must be a broad subjective assessment, as is the case for adults under the MCA. 
Parental authority through legislated responsibility exists to protect a natural element 
of parenting and it is without question that this is a feature of the upbringing of all 
children. However, as Akerele (2014) argues, it is not the case that this ordinarily 
involves inpatient secure care for a prolonged period of time.  
 
The Code of Practice asks that, in establishing the limits of parental responsibility, 
account be taken of the child’s rights under Article 5 and the rights of the parents 
under Article 8 in respect of family life. This relationship between the child’s and 
parents’ rights under the ECHR draws attention to the importance of Gillam’s (2010) 
point about defining the scope of parental consent. Watts and Mackenzie (2013) 
suggested that all cases on whether a decision falls in the zone of parental control are 
Page 10 of 38Tizard Learning Disability Review
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
Tizard Learning Disability Review
 
 11
published to provide a body of knowledge to clinicians. However, the cases are so 
fact specific and dependent on individual diagnosis and circumstance that this could 
create further confusion. Furthermore, it is recognised that clinicians and 
practitioners, faced with the expectation to interpret a complex body of case law, are 
already reluctant to accept parental consent without court approval (Paul, 2004). The 
challenge for clinicians is, as summarised by Cave (2014), to involve the parents 
whilst still ensuring that the child’s rights under the ECHR are not breached. Keehan J 
appeared to dismiss this position in the first case of Trust A v X, favouring greater 
reliance on the parent’s rights under Article 8 (the Right to Privacy and Family Life). 
Reliance on this decision would allow that the breach of Article 5 can be avoided 
through parental consent and, therefore, that a child is deprived of liberty without 
safeguarding and judicial review. 
 
Is it Common Sense? 
Keehan J held that it would be disproportionate and without common sense to not 
allow parental consent to authorise the deprivation of liberty in D’s case. Indeed, 
under English law, parents have the ability to consent for treatment or care providing 
it is in the best interests of the child, satisfying the welfare principle under the CA. In 
Nielson the ECtHR acknowledged that parents could consent to medical treatment 
necessary for the immediate health of their children under Article 5, this not 
breaching the child’s rights under the same, even if the child disagreed. In the case of 
deprivation of liberty, this may be a flawed argument outside of immediate treatment 
necessity for two reasons. Firstly, in a broader context there are obvious limits to the 
zone of parental control, for example a parent could not provide sexual consent for a 
sixteen year old. Secondly, in recognition of the importance that the ECtHR has 
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 12
placed on protecting the human rights of children and that if a ‘gilded cage is still a 
cage’, then the right to procedural and judicial review under Article 5 remains. To put 
it simply, a ‘common sense’ approach is contradictory to the complex nature of these 
cases for all those involved, particularly the child, and this is where safeguarding 
would support children in long-term care where there is a deprivation of liberty.  
 
The alternative advocated here is an amended version of Mackenzie and Watts’ 
(2014) DoLS (Minors’ Safeguards)
 
with the support of the Family Courts, to provide 
the right for review to those aged under sixteen. The DoLS (Minors’ Safeguards) 
would allow for a  
‘series of assessments including a mental health assessment, a mental 
capacity assessment, a children’s rights assessment and a best interests 
assessment by a number of trained professionals’ (Mackenzie and Watts, 
2014, p.101). 
This proposal might be usefully amended to consider learning disability assessment as 
separate to mental health assessment. This separation is recognised by Herlihy and 
Holloway (2009) as being in line with the separation of learning disability from 
mental health disorder within current law. The assessments would allow for greater 
safeguards in considering deprivations of liberty for children but would also support 
the avoidance of a breach of Article 5, as they are intended to do in adults (Mackenzie 
and Watts, 2014). Additionally they could also incorporate Cave’s (2014) suggestion 
that the best interests test under the MCA be universally applied. Gratton (2013) 
further argues in favour of a holistic capacity assessment where it may have been 
assumed that a child lacks capacity based on a learning disability. Bartlett (2014) 
argues that there has to be recognition that safeguarding can be harmful to the 
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wellbeing of those who do not need such intervention. However, it should be noted 
that such safeguards would remove the requirement of a subjective assessment by a 
clinician and recognise the importance of parental consent through a more holistic 
approach, involving the child as much as possible. Furthermore, safeguarding would 
allow a more consistent framework and provide an alternative to the current arbitrary 
age law.   
 
There are further, potentially valid objections to this suggestion: whether these 
safeguards are needed when cases are already brought before the courts; and whether 
the increased guidance for deprivation of liberty in the 2015 MHA Code of Practice is 
sufficient enough for both clinicians and the courts. Regarding the former, the ECtHR 
recognised that UK law had insufficient safeguards for deprivation of liberty prior to 
the DoLS. The DoLS might be considered to be correcting a legal technicality but, as 
Kelly (2011) argues, in practice they also provide that a deprivation of liberty is 
justified and considered under a broad scope of assessment, allowing the Court of 
Protection to provide judicial review when required. Hawkins et al. (2011) suggest 
that the relationship between parents and clinicians would be better supported through 
the demonstration of a robust process to ensure that the child’s best interests are being 
considered. Such would certainly be the case using the DoLS (Minors’ Safeguards) 
and they would also be expected to reduce the use of the court by clinicians, 
healthcare trusts and local authorities to determine the zone of parental control. In 
response to the objection, it is true that the MHA Code of Practice has expanded in 
light of Cheshire West. However, it still requires clinicians and practitioners to make 
subjective judgements. Furthermore, if the law in Birmingham City Council v D and 
Trust A v X is to be applied, then this could result in an expectation by parents that 
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they have  complete authority following Keehan J’s decision not to provide guidance 
for all cases of deprivation of liberty for those under 16. It is argued here, therefore, 
that the MHA Code of Practice is insufficient and, because of the complex nature of 
the assessment in relation to rights, a safeguarding system that considers the issues in 
a broad context and through the skills of a number of professionals and the parents is 
preferable. 
 
Conclusion 
From the outset this paper has argued that decisions regarding deprivation of liberty in 
children under the age of sixteen should reflect, in part, parental choice. The cause for 
concern is the sovereignty of parental consent over all else. The law is confusing. In 
one respect rights under the ECHR are universal. However, in the context of these 
children’s right under Article 5, courts have demonstrated an acceptance of the 
premise that it is entirely within the zone of parental control to effectively deprive a 
child of liberty without procedural or judicial review. However, where parental 
consent is not involved, the courts have supported the provision of such safeguards in 
the form of reviews.  This juxtaposition seems ridiculous in the case of long-term 
inpatient care and clinicians have demonstrated their discomfort with this extension of 
the zone of parental control. It seems illogical for the law to allow a child to be 
provided with no legislated safeguarding, yet that same child be subject to legislative 
protection upon attaining the age of sixteen, or be provided with such protection if the 
court itself authorises a deprivation of liberty. This is particularly of concern when the 
child’s capacity to make their own decisions about such matters is always likely to b  
limited. Such a state of affairs highlights the failed application of Article 5 to 
children, stemming from Nielson.  
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This paper has only discussed long-term inpatient care but consideration should be 
given to applying the suggested safeguarding to a broader context. While such 
extension might be controversial, it is paramount that sufficiently structured and 
multidimensional assessment (as currently provided in adulthood) is carried out to 
establish the best interests of those who are unable to make their own decisions. 
Indeed, the proposed amended DoLS (Minors’ Safeguarding) should be considered by 
the Law Commission in their current review and implemented into any changes. Most 
profoundly, adopting such safeguarding for children would correct the deficit that 
both the ECtHR and the domestic court’s interpretations of Article 5 have created, 
leading to the confusing cases that are now setting worrying precedents for the scope 
of parental consent.  
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The Zone of Parental Control, The ‘Gilded Cage’ And The Deprivation of a 
Child’s Liberty: Getting Around Article 5. 
Abstract 
Despite the significance of Cheshire West and the impact it has had on the scope of 
being deprived of liberty, children under the age of sixteen remain vulnerable through 
a lack of protection under Article 5. This paper will specifically analyse the legal 
position of children under sixteen who lack capacity to make the decision to consent 
to long-term inpatient care. My main argument is that as a result of parental consent 
being recognised as holding legal authority, these children have their right to liberty 
under Article 5 engaged. In recognition of the courts not currently supporting my 
position, I will argue that the reason this is the case, stems from the confusing concept 
of the zone of parental control in relation to deprivation of liberty. A doctrinal 
methodology is used, examining domestic law and the European Convention on 
Human Rights, with analysis of relevant literature. Deprivation of liberty in 
incompetent children under the age of sixteen should undoubtedly in part include 
parental consent, but it is parental consent having sovereignty over whether a child is 
being deprived of liberty that causes concern. The law is confusing, in one respect 
rights under the ECHR are universal, however in the context of these children’s right 
under Article 5 the courts demonstrate an acceptance of the premise that it is entirely 
within the zone of parental control to effectively deprive a child of liberty without 
procedural or judicial review. Furthermore, there are wider potential issues for 
children being considered to be deprived of liberty following Cheshire West. 
Introduction 
Page 19 of 38 Tizard Learning Disability Review
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
Tizard Learning Disability Review
 
 2
The Mental Health Act 1983 Code of Practice describes the law that covers 
admissions to hospital and treatment for mental disorders in children as ‘complex’.
1
 
Whereas this paper will establish that following P v Cheshire West and Chester 
Council 
2
 (referred to as Cheshire West), the law’s consideration of the right to liberty 
under Article 5 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR)
3
 for 
incompetent children under the age of sixteen is not only complex but indeed 
confusing. This confusion exists because despite Baroness Hale’s universal 
recognition of Article 5 in Cheshire West, both European and domestic case law, 
previously and subsequently, has allowed children to be deprived of liberty without 
judicial review, using parental consent as sufficient justification.  The differing legal 
protection for deprivation of liberty in children under the age of sixteen, with a mental 
health disorder or a learning disability, was highlighted in the very recent case of 
Birmingham City Council v D 
4
 and the earlier decision in the same case Trust A v X 
5
. 
Keehan J held that a parent could consent to what would amount to a deprivation of 
liberty, however this would not be the case for the same child when they attain the age 
of sixteen because of the protection afforded under the Mental Capacity Act (MCA) 
2005.
6
   
 
This paper will specifically analyse the legal position of children under sixteen who 
lack capacity to make the decision to consent to long-term inpatient care. My main 
argument is that as a result of parental consent being recognised as holding legal 
                                                        
1 Department of Health, Code of Practice Mental Health Act 1983 (HMSO 2015) <www.gov.uk> 
accessed 18/03/2016 
2 [2014] UKSC 19 
3 < http://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/Convention_ENG.pdf > accessed 09/03/2016 
4 [2016] EWCOP 8 
5 [2015] EWHC 922 (Fam) 
6 Birmingham City Council v D [2016] EWCOP [142] 
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 3
authority, these children have their right to liberty under Article 5 engaged. In 
recognition of the courts not currently supporting my position, I will argue that the 
reason this is the case stems from the confusing concept of the zone of parental 
control in relation to deprivation of liberty. My argument is not that parents have no 
rights to make decisions regarding their children, it is simply that if an incompetent 
child is deprived of liberty in long-term in-patient care, the same level of safeguarding 
that is provided to adults should be provided to children. I suggest that not only does 
this provide equality and promote the universal application of the right to liberty, 
regardless of age, but also that such safeguarding would support both parents and 
clinicians in decision-making. I argue that the notion of a ‘common sense’
7
 approach 
to the zone of parental responsibility is not satisfactory where the issue is deprivation 
of liberty. Furthermore, that the logical solution is to support Mackenzie and Watts’
8
 
notion of legislation to provide procedural safeguarding through ‘Deprivation of 
Liberty Safeguards for Minors’. I will only focus on the legal position of depriving a 
child of their liberty in healthcare settings, where that detention is not made under the 
Mental Health Act 1983 (MHA) or if applicable under section 25 of the Children Act 
1989 (CA), in which there are legislated procedural requirements and reviews
9
.  
 
Deprivation of Liberty: The Gap between Children, Young People and Adults 
The law under Gillick
10
 enables the competent child under the age of sixteen to 
consent to treatment, although in the case of refusal of treatment the courts almost 
                                                        
7 Trust A v X [2015] EWHC 922 (Fam) [64]  
8 Mackenzie R, Watts J, ‘Is childhood a disability? Using Mental Capacity Tribunals and the 
Deprivation of Liberty Safeguards to shield children’s capacity to consent to and refuse medical 
treatment’ (2014) Law and Disability Review 9 (2) 96-106 
9 Kelly B, ‘ Mental Health Legislation and Human Rights in England, Wales and the Republic of 
Ireland’ (2011) International Journal of Law and Psychiatry 34 439-454 
10 Gillick v West Norfolk and Wisbech Area Health Authority [1986] AC 112 
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 4
entirely overrule any such decision.
11
 The child under the age of sixteen who is 
incompetent to make decisions regarding their health has their welfare protected 
under the CA, whereby parents have a responsibility to act in their child’s best 
interests.
12
 In the case of children with a mental disorder, the emphasis is on those 
children and young people receiving treatment that is decided to be in their best 
interests and to avoid deprivation of liberty through use of the MHA.
13
 However, 
cases concerning deprivation of liberty are most common outside of the MHA, where 
that child is not competent to make a decision to consent to inpatient treatment 
through either having a mental health disorder or having a learning disability that 
renders them incompetent.
14
  Outside of the MHA, deprivation of liberty for children 
under sixteen is either lawfully sanctioned by the courts under their inherent 
jurisdiction or considered not to be a deprivation of liberty, as it lies within the zone 
of parental responsibility.
15
 In sharp contrast, those over the age of sixteen in the same 
position are protected under the MCA in accordance with the Family Law Reform Act 
1969 and furthermore, on attaining the age of eighteen are protected under the 
Deprivation of Liberty Safeguards (DoLS)
16
.  
 
                                                        
11 Cave E, ‘Competence and authority: adolescent treatment refusals for physical and mental 
health conditions’ (2013) Contemporary Social Science 8 (2) 92-103 
12 ‘Meaning of “parental responsibility”. 
3 (1) In this Act “parental responsibility” means all the rights, duties, powers, responsibilities and 
authority which by law a parent of a child has in relation to the child and his property.’ 
13 Supra: Cave E (2013) 
14 Bowers M, Dubicka B, ‘Legal dilemmas for clinicians involved in the care and treatment of 
children and young people with a mental disorder’ (2009) Child: Care, Health and Development 
36 (4) 592-596 
15 Ibid 
16 The National Archives (2007) The Mental Capacity Act Deprivation of Liberty Safeguards 
 http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk (accessed 21/03/2016) 
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 5
The DoLS were introduced in response to HL v UK 
17
, originally known as 
Bournewood, where the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) held that the 
admission of a patient with learning disabilities and autism was a deprivation of 
liberty as he was not permitted to leave, consequently engaging Article 5 of the 
ECHR. Furthermore, that in accordance with Article 5, such deprivation must be 
subject to judicial review and as this was not provided for in the MCA, a gap was 
identified in the compatibility of domestic law and the ECHR, known as the 
‘Bournewood gap’. The DoLS provide procedural safeguards to protect vulnerable 
adults who are not being detained under the MHA but are deprived of their liberty.
18
 
Importantly these do not apply to those under the age of eighteen, instead this is 
where common law and the CA are relied upon for those under the age of sixteen and 
the MCA for those aged sixteen and seventeen.
19
 Therefore, within the scope of 
children’s decision-making, deprivation of liberty outside of the MHA is 
differentiated from that of adults by the lack of legislative safeguarding procedures. 
The issue identified is how a lack of universal safeguarding can be compatible with 
Article 5, if the right to liberty is universal? 
20
  
 
The Influence of the European Court of Human Rights 
The right to liberty is provided under Article 5 of the ECHR. Deprivation of liberty 
can be considered lawful for those ‘of unsound mind’, providing that such deprivation 
is carried out within a legal framework
21
. Baroness Hale reiterated in Cheshire West 
                                                        
17 (2005) 40 E.H.R.R 32 
18 Mackenzie R, Watts J, ‘Mind the gap: the Deprivation of Liberty Safeguards in the amended 
Mental Capacity Act 2005’ (2010) Learning Disability Review 5 (1) 51-55 
19 Ibid 
20 Samanta J, Samanta A, Medical Law (2nd Ed, Palgrave 2015) pp372 
21  Section 1 (e) 
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 6
the ‘universal character’ of the ECHR being for everyone.
22
  Specifically, Baroness 
Hale considered the universal application of Article 5 regardless of disability; ‘In my 
view, it is axiomatic that people with disabilities, both mental and physical, have the 
same human rights as the rest of the human race. It may be that those rights have 
sometimes to be limited or restricted because of their disabilities, but the starting 
point should be the same as that for everyone else.’
23
 The issue though for the ECtHR 
has been interpreting Article 5 in the context of whether a deprivation or merely a 
restriction of liberty has been imposed upon an individual. 
 
In Guzzardi v Italy 
24
 the ECtHR considered the distinction between deprivation and 
restriction of liberty, holding that it was an objective test relating to only the intensity 
or degree as opposed to subjective and therefore the nature or substance that 
determines a deprivation of liberty.
25
 Later though in Storck v Germany 
26
, a 
subjective element was added, in that a deprivation could only occur if the person had 
not validly consented to the deprivation.  
 
Prior to Storck, the objective test was applied to children n Nielson v Denmark
27
, 
where a twelve year old was detained in a psychiatric facility on the consent of his 
mother. The court held that there was not a deprivation of liberty; rather it was the 
exercise of a responsible parent with custodial rights.
28
 However, the court did 
recognise that the State is obligated to ensure that parental consent did not have 
                                                        
22 P v Cheshire West and Chester Council [2014] UKSC 19 [36] 
23 Ibid: [45] 
24 (1980) 3 EHRR 333 
25 Ibid: [93] 
26 (2005) 43 EHRR 96 [74] 
27 (1988) 11 EHRR 175 
28 Ibid: [73] 
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 7
unlimited scope, importantly that it could not deprive a child of liberty.
29
 Nielson was 
heavily criticised on the basis that the child’s views were not considered in the depth 
they would be today.
30
 Furthermore, that as the duration of the admission was several 
months, parental authority was questioned as to whether long term admission to 
inpatient treatment for a mental health disorder only required parental consent and 
whether such duration of treatment did amount to a deprivation of liberty.
31
 This point 
was most accurately articulated by Judge Salcedo dissenting, who held that ‘ the fact 
that a parent may legally, and without being subject to any judicial review, place a 
child who in his custody in a psychiatric ward, constitutes a violation of Article 5 
(1)’.
32
 I suggest that had the dissenting opinion been applied to the ruling in Nielson 
and a deprivation of liberty found, the requirement for judicial review in accordance 
with Article 5 (4) would have resulted in the DoLS being applied to all persons 
deprived of liberty regardless of age. 
The Impact of The ‘Gilded Cage’ For Children 
Before addressing the domestic interpretation of Article 5 and Nielson in relation to a 
child’s deprivation of liberty, it is paramount to analyse the scope of the application of 
any breach to a child’s right under Article 5, following Cheshire West. The Supreme 
Court established that a deprivation of liberty must subjectively lack the consent of 
the person. Objectively, Baroness Hale considered the decision in Guzzardi and held 
that a deprivation of liberty must amount to a restriction of physical liberty.
33
 In 
considering the scope and universal application of the definition of deprivation of 
liberty, Baroness Hale further held that; ‘If it would be a deprivation of my liberty to 
                                                        
29 Ibid: [72] 
30 Harbour A, Children with Mental Disorder and the Law (Jessica Kingsley Publishers 2008) pp 
29 
31 Ibid 
32 Nielson v Denmark (1988) 11 EHRR 175 [24]. 
33 [46] 
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 8
be obliged to live in a particular place, subject to constant monitoring and control, 
only allowed out with close supervision, and unable to move away without permission 
even if such an opportunity became available, then it must also be a deprivation of the 
liberty of a disabled person. The fact that my living arrangements are comfortable, 
and indeed make my life as enjoyable as it could possibly be, should make no 
difference. A gilded cage is still a cage.’
34
  
 
This broadened definition went beyond earlier interpretations of Article 5 in 
Bournewood, but effectively meant that the number of people deprived of their liberty 
was increased as a result of the widened definition.
35
 In response Stavert questions 
whether the DoLS even now satisfy the procedural requirement under Article 5.
36
 In 
particular, Stavert identifies incompetent children and young people as being 
particularly vulnerable because of both the lack of safeguarding and the broad scope 
of health and social care settings that could potentially deprive liberty following 
Cheshire West.
37
 The Department of Health (DH) did issue guidance following 
Cheshire West, however the issues for those under the age of eighteen were not 
addressed.
38
 It could be considered that the responsibilities expected of parents to the 
welfare of their children justify there being no safeguarding requirements, particularly 
because of the complex and differing needs and settings within caring for incompetent 
                                                        
34 Ibid 
35 Penny C, Exworthy T, ‘ A gilded cage is still a cage: Cheshire West widens ‘deprivation of 
liberty’ ’ (2015) British journal of Psychiatry 206 (2) 91-92 
36 Stavert J, ‘Deprivation of Liberty and Persons with Incapacity: The Cheshire West Ruling’ 
(2015) Edinburgh Law Review 19 (1) 129-134 
37 Ibid 
38 Department of Health, Department of Health Guidance: Response to the Supreme Court 
Judgment/ Deprivation of Liberty Safeguards (HMSO 2015) < www.gov.uk> (accessed 
21/03/2016)  
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 9
children, being better decided by their parents.
39
 However, this position fails to 
consider the potentially unlawful position that Cheshire West has now placed local 
authorities, charities, hospital trusts, clinicians and other practitioners in, where 
deprivation of liberty is of concern.
40
 This is where I argue the law has become 
confused in interpreting Article 5 and the unsatisfactory position Keehan J has 
established. 
 
The Scope of Article 5 for Children within English Law 
The common law position of parental consent authorising treatment for mental health 
disorders, which could also amount to a deprivation of liberty for incompetent 
children under the age of sixteen, was established in a series of cases at the end of the 
twentieth century. In the cases of Re R 
41
 and Re K, W and H 
42
 the courts held that 
parental consent was valid for compulsory psychiatric treatment and did not require 
further court approval. Arguably these cases relate to refusal of treatment, however 
the treatment involved admission to secure inpatient psychiatric hospitals, the children 
were not free to leave and the treatment was not carried out under the MHA. Hawkins 
et al suggest that if these cases were considered today in l ght of the Human Rights 
Act 1998, deprivation of liberty would be a central issue.
43
 
 
Despite the Mental Capacity Act 2005 not being applicable to children under 16, 
section 25 of Children Act 1989 does allow for the courts to authorise local 
                                                        
39 Wheeler R, Crabb A, ‘The legal basis for compulsorily detaining children and young people for 
treatment’ (2016) Archives of Disease in Childhood 101 (3) 210-211 
40 Supra: Penny C, Exworthy T, 
41 [1991] 3 WLR 592 
42 [1993] 1 FLR 854 
43 Hawkins T, Player B, Curtice M, ‘The zone of parental control and decision-making in young 
people, legal derivation and influences’ (2011) Advances in Psychiatric Treatment 17 220-226 
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 10
authorities to restrict the liberty of children. This is within the limits of where that 
secure accommodation is necessary to prevent them from absconding or to protect the 
child from self-harm or harming others, outside of a clinical setting.
44
 In authorising 
such a restriction, the courts must specify duration and that the child must be legally 
represented in any hearings.
45
  
 
In Re K
46
 the Court of appeal considered whether restricting liberty under section 25 
of the CA was compatible with Article 5. Butler-Sloss P held that it was compatible 
because of the judicial review involved in such decisions and that it was within the 
jurisdiction of the courts to prevent the child or others from harm, however that if 
such restrictions were authorised by a parent alone it would not be compatible with 
Article 5.
47
 In RK v BCC, YB and AK 
48
 the Court of Appeal was asked this question 
again in relation to deprivation of liberty and Mostyn J’s decision in the lower court, 
that section 25 would never result in deprivation of liberty in respect of Article 5. 
Although agreeing that on the facts of the case, only a restriction of liberty had 
amounted, the court was not in agreement that a deprivation of liberty could never 
occur under section 25. Thorpe LJ held that a parent cannot lawfully detain or deprive 
a child of their liberty without it engaging Article 5.
49
 However, both Lord Neuberger 
and Lord Kerr in Cheshire West disagreed with this, as they recognised that 
deprivation of liberty does occur during childhood within the family home and is well 
within the expected responsibilities of parents within society.
50
 This is where the 
                                                        
44 Section 25 (1) 
45 Section 25 (4) and (6) 
46 [2001] Fam 377 
47 Ibid: [29] 
48 [2011] EWCA Civ 1305 
49 [14] 
50 [72] and [75] 
Page 28 of 38Tizard Learning Disability Review
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
Tizard Learning Disability Review
 
 11
decision by Keehan J in Trust A v X was so crucial, as to whether parent’s consenting 
to what could otherwise be considered a deprivation of liberty outside of section 25 in 
long-term inpatient care fell within the zone of parental control. 
 
As already highlighted the decision was that parents did have the authority to provide 
such consent and before continuing my argument that the decision was incorrect, it is 
worth noting the valid argument against common law establishing such a legal 
position. The scope of the common law could certainly be viewed as too broad and 
that the authority should be legislative in the case of mental health law to provide 
greater clarity and align with existing mental health legislation.
51
 Indeed perhaps it is 
the role of Parliament to explore the issue of deprivation of liberty in children and 
through collaboration with parents, clinicians and practitioners. 
 
The Zone of Parental Control 
The concept of the zone of parental control was established in the MHA Code of 
Practice 2008 update.
52
 The concept was introduced to provide greater clarity for 
clinicians involved in decision-making with children and young people, as the 
expectation to consider both legislation and evolving common law was far too 
subjective.
53
 The zone of parental control allowed parents to consent for treatment and 
inpatient admission through recognition of Nielson, although no definition was 
provided because the cases were dependent on the individual facts.
54
 The concept of 
                                                        
51 Supra: Kelly B,  
52 Department of Health, Code of Practice Mental Health Act 1983 (HMSO 2008) para 36.9 
<www.gov.uk> (accessed 18/03/2016) 
53 Supra: Hawkins T, Player B, Curtice M, 
54 Ibid 
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the zone of parental control was widely criticised.
55
 Watts and Mackenzie
56
 argue that 
it left far too greater subjectivity for clinicians when interpreting the guidance. In the 
case of psychiatric treatment for a long duration, where a deprivation of liberty would 
otherwise occur without the parental consent, Gillam
57
 raised concern over the ethical 
boundaries that differ from short-term treatment admission. Gillam further described 
the original concept as being so wide that a definition of the scope of parental consent 
was needed.
58
 
 
Following Cheshire West, the MHA Code of Practice was updated in 2015 and 
attempted to expand on the concept. Specifically, the update provided a section on the 
deprivation of liberty of children, recognising the complexities of such cases.
59
 The 
Code of Practice requires that clinicians have regard to the degree of parental control 
and supervision that would be expected for a child of that age with the characteristics 
of the child in question.
60
 However, this approach fails to acknowledge that if a child 
is deemed incompetent and this is not going to change in adulthood, why should 
parents not continue to provide such control after the age of sixteen? What is 
highlighted is the arbitrary consideration of age under domestic law, where the issue 
must be a broad subjective assessment, as is the case for adults under the MCA. 
Parental authority through legislated responsibility exists to protect a natural element 
of parenting and it is without question that this is a feature of the upbringing of all 
                                                        
55 Ibid 
56 Watts J, Mackenzie R, ‘The zone of parental control: a reasonable idea or an unusable concept?’ 
(2013) Learning Disability Review 18 (1) 38-44 
57 Gillam L, ‘Children’s Bioethics and the Zone of Parental Discretion’ (2010) Bioethics Review 29 
(2) 1-3 
58 Ibid 
59 Para’s 19.44-19.88 
60 Para’s 19.47-19.48 
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children, however it is not the case that this ordinarily involves inpatient secure 
treatment for a prolonged period of time.
61
  
 
Within the zone of parental control, the Code of Practice asks that in establishing the 
limits of parental responsibility, account be taken of the child’s rights under Article 5 
and the rights of the parents under Article 8 in respect to the right to family life. This 
relationship between both the child and parents’ rights under the ECHR is where the 
rationale for a definitive scope suggested by Gillam could be beneficial.
62
 Watts and 
Mackenzie suggested that all cases deciding on whether a decision falls in the zone of 
parental control are published to provide a body of knowledge to clinicians.
63
 I 
disagree and argue that this would provide further confusion, as cases are so fact 
specific and dependent on individual diagnosis and circumstance. Furthermore, it is 
recognised that clinicians and practitioners being expected to interpret a complex 
body of case law still results in a reluctance to accept parental consent without court 
approval now.
64
 The challenge for clinicians is involving the parents whilst still 
ensuring that the child’s rights under the ECHR are not engaged.
65
 Keehan J appears 
to dismiss this position in the first case of D, favouring greater reliance on the 
parent’s rights under Article 8.
66
 Relying on this decision allows that the engagement 
of Article 5 can be avoided through parental consent and therefore that a child is 
deprived of liberty without safeguarding and judicial review. 
                                                        
61 Akerele F, ‘Adolescent decision-making and the zone of parental control: a missed opportunity 
for legislative change’ (2014) Advances in Psychiatric Treatment 20 144-150 
62 Supra: Gillam L, 
63 Supra: Watts J, Mackenzie R, (2013) 
64 Paul M, ‘Decision-making about children’s mental health care: ethical challenges’ (2004) 
Advances in Psychiatric Treatment 10 301-311 
65 Cave E, ‘Goodbye Gillick? Identifying and resolving problems with the concept of child 
competence’ (2014) Legal Studies 34 (1) 103-122  
66 Trust A v X [2015] EWHC 922 (Fam) [57] 
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Is it Common Sense? 
Keehan J held that it would be disproportionate and without common sense to not 
allow parental consent to authorise the deprivation of liberty in D’s case.
67
 I suggest 
this is a flawed argument, in that if a ‘gilded cage is still a cage’ then the right to 
procedural and judicial review under Article 5 remains. To put it simply a ‘common 
sense’ approach is contradictory to the complex nature of these cases for all those 
involved, particularly the child, and this is where safeguarding would support children 
in long term care where there is a deprivation of liberty.  
 
The alternative I support is an amended version of Mackenzie and Watts’ DoLS 
(Minors’ Safeguards)
 68
 with the support of the Family Courts, to provide the right for 
review to those aged under sixteen. The DoLS (Minors’ Safeguards) would allow for 
a ‘series of assessments to including a mental health assessment, a mental capacity 
assessment, a children’s rights assessment and a best interests assessment by a 
number of trained professionals’
69
. I would suggest that these safeguards are amended 
to consider learning disability assessment as separate to mental health assessment, in 
line with the separation of learning disability from mental health disorder within 
current law.
70
 The assessments would allow for greater safeguards in considering 
deprivations of liberty for children but would also support the avoidance of 
engagement of Article 5, as they are intended to do in adults.
71
 Additionally they 
                                                        
67 Ibid: [64] 
68 Supra: Mackenzie R, Watts J, (2014) 
69 Ibid: pp 101. 
 
70 Herlihy D, Holloway F, ‘The Mental health Act and the Mental Capacity Act: untangling the 
relationship’ (2009) Psychiatry 8 (12) 478-481 
71 Supra: Mackenzie R, Watts J, (2014) 
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could also incorporate Cave’s
72
 suggestion that the best interests test under the MCA 
be universally applied. Gratton further argues in favour of a holistic capacity 
assessment where it may have been assumed that a child lacks capacity based on a 
learning disability.
73
 There does though have to be recognition that safeguarding can 
be harmful to the wellbeing of those who do not need such intervention.
74
 In response, 
such safeguards would I suggest remove the requirement of a subjective assessment 
by a clinician and recognise the importance of parental consent through a more 
holistic approach, involving the children in as much as possible. Furthermore, would 
allow a more consistent framework and provide an alternative to the current arbitrary 
age law.   
 
There are further valid objections to this suggestion; whether these safeguards are 
needed when the cases are brought before the courts as it is and whether the increased 
guidance for deprivation of liberty in the 2015 MHA Code of Practice is sufficient 
enough for both clinicians and the courts. In response to whether these safeguards are 
needed, the ECtHR recognised that UK law had insufficient safeguards for 
deprivation of liberty prior to the DoLS. The DoLS can be considered to just be 
correcting a legal technicality but in practice they also provide that a deprivation of 
liberty is justified and considered under a broad scope of assessment, allowing the 
Court of Protection to provide judicial review when required.
75
 Hawkins et al suggest 
that the relationship between parents and clinicians would be better support d through 
the demonstration of a robust process to ensure that the child’s best interests are being 
                                                        
72 Supra: Cave E, (2014) 
73 Gratton S, ‘Use of the Mental capacity Act with children and young people with intellectual 
disability’ (2013) Advances in Mental Health and Intellectual Disabilities 7 (2) 88-92 
74 Bartlett P, ‘Reforming the Deprivation of Liberty Safeguards (DOLS): What Is It Exactly that We 
Want?’ (2014) European Journal of Current Legal Issues 20 (3) 1-24 
75 Supra: Kelly B, (2011) 
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considered.
76
 This would certainly be supported using the DoLS (Minors’ Safeguards) 
but it is also suggested that they would reduce the role of the court being required by 
clinicians, healthcare trusts and local authorities to determine the zone of parental 
control. In response to the second objection that the MHA Code of Practice is 
sufficient for clinicians, it has to be recognised that the explanation has expanded in 
light of Cheshire West. However, it still remains subjective to those treating clinicians 
or practitioners. Furthermore, if the law in Trust A v X is to be applied, then this could 
result in an expectation by parents that they have authority following Keehan J’s 
decision not to provide guidance for all cases of deprivation of liberty for those under 
16.
77
 I therefore suggest that the MHA Code of Practice is insufficient and because of 
the complex nature of the assessment, in relation to rights, a safeguarding system of 
assessments that considers the issues in a broad context and through the skills of a 
number of professionals and the parents, is far more preferable. 
 
Conclusion 
From the outset I made clear that deprivation of liberty in incompetent children under 
the age of sixteen should undoubtedly in part include parental consent, but it is 
parental consent having sovereignty over whether a child is being deprived of liberty 
that causes concern. The law is confusing, in one respect rights under the ECHR are 
universal, however in the context of these children’s right under Article 5 the courts 
demonstrate an acceptance of the premise that it is entirely within the zone of parental 
control to effectively deprive a child of liberty without procedural or judicial review. 
This is ridiculous in the case of long-term inpatient care and clinicians have 
demonstrated that they are uncomfortable with the extension of this zone of parental 
                                                        
76 Supra: Hawkins T, Player B, Curtice M,  
77 [68] 
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control. It seems illogical for the law to allow a child to be provided with no legislated 
safeguarding, yet that same child be subject to legislative protection upon attaining 
the age of sixteen. This is particularly of concern when that child will never become 
competent to make their own decisions and highlights the failed application of Article 
5 to children, stemming from Nielson.  
 
I have only discussed long-term inpatient care but there has to be consideration of 
applying the suggested safeguarding to a broader context. This does indeed warrant 
further discussion beyond this paper and will likely be controversial. However, what 
should be paramount is that safeguarding would allow a more structured and 
multidimensional assessment, as is provided in adults, to establish the best interests of 
those who are unable to do so. Indeed the proposed amended DoLS (Minors’ 
Safeguarding) should be viewed as a supportive scaffolding to promote a holistic and 
thorough assessment of the child’s best interests, with recognition that parental views 
are paramount. If such treatment involves a deprivation of liberty, then the right to 
judicial review would be available. Most profoundly, adopting such safeguarding for 
children would correct the deficit that the ECtHR and the domestic judiciaries’ 
interpretation of Article 5 has created, leading to the confusing cases that are now 
setting worrying precedents.  
 
No conflicts of interest. 
 
 
 
 
Page 35 of 38 Tizard Learning Disability Review
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
Tizard Learning Disability Review
 
 18
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Bibliography 
Akerele F, ‘Adolescent decision-making and the zone of parental control: a missed 
opportunity for legislative change’ (2014) Advances in Psychiatric Treatment 20 144-
150. 
 
Bartlett P, ‘Reforming the Deprivation of Liberty Safeguards (DOLS): What Is It 
Exactly that We Want?’ (2014) European Journal of Current Legal Issues 20 (3) 1-
24. 
 
Page 36 of 38Tizard Learning Disability Review
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
Tizard Learning Disability Review
 
 19
Bowers M, and Dubicka B, ‘Legal dilemmas for clinicians involved in the care and 
treatment of children and young people with a mental disorder’ (2009) Child: Care, 
Health and Development 36 (4) 592-596. 
 
Cave E, ‘Competence and authority: adolescent treatment refusals for physical and 
mental health conditions’ (2013) Contemporary Social Science 8 (2) 92-103.  
 
Cave E, ‘Goodbye Gillick? Identifying and resolving problems with the concept of 
child competence’ (2014) Legal Studies 34 (1) 103-122. 
 
Department of Health, Code of Practice Mental Health Act 1983 (2015 HMSO)  
<www.gov.uk> (accessed 18/03/2016). 
 
General Medical Council, ‘0-18 years Guidance’, Good Medical Practice (GMC 
2013). 
 
Gillam L, ‘Children’s Bioethics and the Zone of Parental Discretion’ (2010) Bioethics 
Review 29 (2) 1-3. 
 
Gratton S, ‘Use of the Mental capacity Act with children and young people with 
intellectual disability’ (2013) Advances in Mental Health and Intellectual Disabilities 
7 (2) 88-92. 
 
Harbour A, Children with Mental Disorder and the Law (Jessica Kingsley Publishers 
2008). 
 
Hawkins T, Player B, Curtice M, ‘The zone of parental control and decision-making 
in young people, legal derivation and influences’ (2011) Advances in Psychiatric 
Treatment 17 220-226. 
 
Herlihy D, Holloway F, ‘The Mental health Act and the Mental Capacity Act: 
untangling the relationship’ (2009) Psychiatry 8 (12) 478-481. 
 
Jackson E, Medical Law, Text Cases and Materials (3
rd
 Ed, Oxford University Press 
2013). 
 
Kelly B, ‘ Mental Health Legislation and Human Rights in England, Wales and the 
Republic of Ireland’ (2011) International Journal of Law and Psychiatry 34 439-454. 
 
Mackenzie R, Watts J, ‘Mind the gap: the Deprivation of Liberty Safeguards in the 
amended Mental Capacity Act 2005’ (2010) Learning Disability Review 5 (1) 51-55. 
 
Mackenzie R, Watts J, ‘Is childhood a disability? Using Mental Capacity Tribunals 
and the Deprivation of Liberty Safeguards to shield children’s capacity to consent to 
and refuse medical treatment’ (2014) Law and Disability Review 9 (2): 96-106.  
 
Mason J, Laurie G, Mason and McCall Smith’s Law and Medical Ethics (9
th
 Ed 
Oxford University Press 2013). 
 
Page 37 of 38 Tizard Learning Disability Review
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
Tizard Learning Disability Review
 
 20
McDougall R, Notini L, ‘Overriding parents’ medical decisions for their children: a 
systematic review of normative literature’ Journal of Medical Ethics (2014) 40 448-
452. 
 
Paul M, ‘Decision-making about children’s mental health care: ethical challenges’ 
(2004) Advances in Psychiatric Treatment 10 301-311. 
 
Penny C, Exworthy T, ‘A gilded cage is still a cage: Cheshire West widens 
‘deprivation of liberty’’ (2015) British journal of Psychiatry 206 (2) 91-92. 
 
Samanta J, Samanta A, Medical Law (2
nd
 Ed Palgrave 2015). 
 
Stavert J, ‘Deprivation of Liberty and Persons with Incapacity: The Cheshire West 
Ruling’ (2015) Edinburgh Law Review 19 (1) 129-134. 
 
Watts J, Mackenzie R, ‘The zone of parental control: a reasonable idea or an unusable 
concept?’ (2013) Learning Disability Review 18 (1) 38-44. 
 
Wheeler R, Crabb A, ‘The legal basis for compulsorily detaining children and young 
people for treatment’ (2016) Archives of Disease in Childhood 101 (3) 210-211. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Page 38 of 38Tizard Learning Disability Review
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
